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1 Introduction
Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of heterogeneity in firm productivity,
and the constant reallocation of resources across different firms.1 The focus on productivity
differences has provided new insights into market outcomes such as industrial productivity,
firm pricing and welfare gains from policy changes.2 When firms differ in productivity, the
distribution of resources across firms also affects the allocational efficiency of markets.
Symmetric firm models explain when resource allocation is efficient by examining the trade-
off between quantity and product variety in imperfectly competitive markets.3 When firms dif-
fer in productivity, we must also ask which types of firms should produce and which should
be shut down. Firm differences in productivity introduce two new margins of potential ineffi-
ciency: selection of the right distribution of firms and allocation of the right quantities across
firms. Dhingra and Morrow (2012) show that differences in market power across firms lead to
new trade-offs between variety, quantity and productivity. These considerations impact optimal
policy rules in a fundamental way, distinct from markets with symmetric costs.
Dhingra and Morrow (2012) examine resource allocation in the standard setting of a mo-
nopolistically competitive industry with heterogeneous firm productivity and free entry (e.g.
Melitz 2003)4. They generalize the demand structure to the symmetric directly additive (SDA)5
form of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) which generates a variable elasticity of substitution, and pro-
vides a rich setting for a wide range of market outcomes (Vives 2001; Zhelobodko, Kokovin,
Parenti and Thisse 2012). For example, Ushchev (2017) shows the impact of market expan-
sion on product ranges of firms can be modelled flexibly with SDA preferences, while Dhingra
and Morrow (2012) and Bertoletti et al. (2017) show that increasing markups could result from
market expansion when the elasticity of marginal utility falls with quantity. When elasticities
vary with quantity, firms differ in market power and market allocations reflect the distortions
of imperfect competition. Under SDA, the market maximizes real revenues, which implies that
the private benefits to firms are perfectly aligned with social benefits only under CES demand.
More generally, the market allocation is inefficient because of lack of full appropriability of
consumer surplus and the business stealing externality that firms impose on each other.
Trade creates larger, more competitive markets, which could reduce the distortions associ-
1For instance, Görg et al. (2017) show that firm-size distribution affects the relationship between an industry’s
employment and output..
2Example, Pavcnik (2002); Asplund and Nocke (2006); Foster et al. (2001); Melitz and Redding (2012).
3Example, Spence (1976); Venables (1985); Mankiw and Whinston (1986); Stiglitz (1986).
4The first instance of analysis of a CES model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms was in
Montagna (1995) in a static, partial equilibrium setting
5Labelled as such given the direct utility is additive and the sub utility is the same for all goods.
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ated with imperfect competition and provide welfare gains (Krugman 1987). In the presence
of productivity differences across firms, misallocation varies with firm productivity, which may
be difficult to elicit, especially if how policy treats a firm varies with it’s observed type. One
potential policy option that does not require firm-level information is international integration.
The idea of introducing foreign competition to improve efficiency goes back at least to Melvin
and Warne (1973). Helpman and Krugman (1985) provide sufficient conditions for welfare
gains from trade in symmetric firm trade models. They show when productivity and variety
do not decline after integration, then there are gains from trade.6 Dhingra and Morrow (2012)
show that market integration always provides welfare gains when private and social incentives
are aligned, which is characterized by the demand elasticity and the elasticity of utility in their
setting. This is true for any cost distribution, but requires a regularity condition on preferences
when private markups are decreasing. An increase in market size increases competition and
reduces per capita demand for each variety. When preferences are aligned, market expansion
alters the private and socially relevant demand elasticities for quantity choice in the same direc-
tion. The market therefore incentivizes firms towards the right allocation and provides higher
welfare. Building on this result, Bykadorov et al. (2015) show that aligned preferences are nec-
essary and sufficient for welfare gains from trade under symmetric firms and variable marginal
costs.
While integration can increase welfare, a more ambitious question is: can we ever expect
trade to eliminate the distortions of imperfect competition? Following Stiglitz (1986), this
paper examines market and optimal outcomes as market size becomes arbitrarily large. Small
markets may have insufficient competition, so looking at large markets allows us to understand
where market expansion is headed and when international trade or growth enables markets to
eventually mitigate distortions.
As a benchmark for understanding efficiency gains, we follow the literature on imperfect
competition in large markets and examine whether integration with large global markets leads
to allocational efficiency (Vives 2001, Chapter 6). Integration with large markets will push
outcomes towards a new concept, the “CES limit”, where firms converge to charging constant
markups. Unlike a perfectly competitive limit (Hart 1985), productivity dispersion and market
power persist in the CES limit. Yet the market is efficient and integration with large global
markets is therefore a first-best policy to eliminate the distortions of imperfect competition.
However, as the limit may require a market size which is unattainable even in fully integrated
world markets, integration may be an incomplete tool to reduce distortions.
6Specifically, let w denote the wage and C(w,q) = w(c+ f/q) denote the average unit cost function for pro-
ducing q units of variety c. When firms are symmetric in c, trade is beneficial as long as variety does not fall
(Me ≥Maute ) and average unit cost of the autarky bundle is lower (C(w,q) ·qaut ≤C(w,qaut) ·qaut).
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Our results for large markets are related to an earlier literature that examines the pricing
strategies of symmetric oligopolistic firms as the number of entrants gets large. Previous work
shows oligopolistic firms continue to have market power as the number of entrants gets large
when the residual demand elasticity is bounded (Perloff and Salop 1985, Vives 2001 Chapter
6). We instead examine the limit as market size gets large (because entry is not a primitive
in the monopolistically competitive model), and find that market power and productivity dif-
ferences persist in large markets. Such persistence of imperfect competition is consistent with
the observation of Samuelson (1967) that “the limit may be at an irreducible positive degree
of imperfection” (Khan and Sun 2002). It is remarkable that the large market outcome, which
exhibits productivity differences and remains imperfectly competitive, is socially optimal. This
shows markups and productivity differences are consistent with large markets and efficiency.
While SDA preferences generate a variable elasticity of substitution, they differ from other
symmetric preferences that feature variable elasticities of substitution (VES). For instance, the
literature on monopolistic competition generates variable elasticities through a number of dif-
ferent preference forms, such as quasilinear and quadratic (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008; Nocco et
al. 2013), indirectly additive (Bertoletti and Etro 2016) and homothetic (Benassy 1996; Feenstra
2003). The optimality results generated in other VES, but non-SDA preferences, heterogeneous
firm models differ. For example, Bertoletti et al. (forthcoming) demonstrate for the full class of
indirectly additive preferences (which includes CES preferences), market expansion is neutral
on prices, production and the equilibrium cutoff for active firms, thus replicating the CES re-
sults always, and not just at the limit. However except under CES preferences, the equilibrium
is inefficient in terms of pricing, production and selection. Similarly, Nocco et al. (2017) find
market allocations are inefficient in their setting: the market cutoff productivity is too low and
low cost firms under-produce while high cost firm over-produce in the market.7 Furthermore,
firm heterogeneity makes entry distortions dependent on the cost distribution. Finally, Arkolakis
et al. (forthcoming) consider a demand system encompassing additively separable preferences
with a bounded choke price. While they don’t consider optimality, they discuss the gains from
trade liberalization as in Arkolakis et al. (2012). SDA preferences differ from these preferences,
as they do not have a bounded choke price, and large markets cause heterogeniety across firms
to collapse in this case.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recaps the standard monopolistic competition
framework with firm heterogeneity. Section 3 examines welfare gains from integration, deriving
a limit result for large markets. Section 4 concludes.
7Nocco et al. (2013) show that the mass of firms cannot be unambiguously ranked even when the model is
parameterized with a linear demand and Pareto cost distribution.
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2 Model
We adopt the SDA demand structure of Dixit and Stiglitz within the heterogeneous firm frame-
work of Melitz. Monopolistic competition models with heterogeneous firms differ from earlier
models with product differentiation in two significant ways. First, costs of production are un-
known to firms before sunk costs of entry are incurred. Second, firms are asymmetric in their
costs of production, leading to firm selection based on productivity. This Section lays out the
model and recaps the implications of asymmetric costs for consumers, firms and equilibrium
outcomes.
2.1 Consumers
We explain the SDA demand structure and then discuss consumer demand. The exposition for
consumer demand closely follows Zhelobodko et al. (2012) which works with a similar setting
and builds on work by Vives (2001).
An economy consists of a mass L of identical workers, each endowed with one unit of labor
and facing a wage rate w normalized to one. Workers have identical preferences for a differen-
tiated good. The differentiated good is made available as a continuum N of horizontally differ-
entiated varieties indexed by i ∈ [0,N]. Given prices pi for the varieties, every worker chooses
quantity qi for each of the varieties to maximize her utility subject to her budget constraint.
Preferences over differentiated goods take the general SDA form:
U(q)≡
∫ N
0
u(qi)di (1)
where u(·) is thrice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave on
(0,∞), and u(0) is normalized to zero. The concavity of u ensures consumers love variety
and prefer to spread their consumption over all available varieties. Here u(qi) denotes utility
from an individual variety i. Under CES preferences, u(qi) = q
ρ
i as specified in Dixit-Stiglitz
and Krugman (1980).8
For each variety i, SDA preferences induce an inverse demand p(qi) = u′(qi)/δ where δ
is the consumer’s budget multiplier. As u is strictly increasing and concave, for any fixed
price vector the consumer’s maximization problem is concave. The necessary condition which
determines the inverse demand is sufficient, and has a solution provided inada conditions on
8The specific CES form in Melitz is U(q)≡ (∫ (qρi di)1/ρ but the normalization of the exponent 1/ρ in Equation
(1) will not play a role in allocation decisions.
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u.9 Multiplying both sides of the inverse demand by qi and aggregating over all i, the bud-
get multiplier is δ =
∫ N
0 u
′(qi) · qidi. The consumer budget multiplier δ will act as a demand
shifter and the inverse demand will inherit the properties of the marginal utility u′(qi). In
particular, the inverse demand elasticity |d ln pi/d lnqi| equals the elasticity of marginal util-
ity µ(qi) ≡ |qiu′′(qi)/u′(qi)|, which enables us to characterize market allocations in terms of
demand primitives. Under CES preferences, the elasticity of marginal utility is constant and the
inverse demand elasticity does not respond to consumption (|d ln pi/d lnqi| = µ(qi) = 1−ρ).
When µ ′(qi)> 0, the inverse demand of a variety becomes more elastic as its consumption in-
creases. The opposite holds for µ ′(qi)< 0, where the demand for a variety becomes less elastic
as its price rises. Zhelobodko et al. (2012) show that the elasticity of marginal utility µ(qi)
can also be interpreted in terms of substitution across varieties. For symmetric consumption
levels (qi = q), this elasticity equals the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties. For µ ′(q)> 0, higher consumption per variety or fewer varieties for a given total
quantity, induces a lower elasticity of substitution between varieties. Consumers perceive vari-
eties as being less differentiated when they consume more, but this relationship does not carry
over to heterogeneous consumption levels.
The inverse demand elasticity summarizes market demand, and will enable a characteriza-
tion of market outcomes. A policymaker maximizes utility, and is not concerned with market
prices. Therefore, we define the elasticity of utility ε(qi)≡ u′(qi)qi/u(qi), which will enable a
characterization of optimal allocations. For symmetric consumption levels, Vives (2001) points
out that 1− ε(qi) is the degree of preference for variety as it measures the utility gain from
adding a variety, holding quantity per firm fixed. To get an analogue of the discrete good case,
consider a consumer who ceases to purchase variety 0, or more formally, a basket of varieties
[0,α]. The consumer loses average utility of
∫ α
0 u(qi)di/α per variety and saves an average in-
come of
∫ α
0 piqidi/α per variety. The savings can be used to increase consumption of all other
varieties proportionally by
∫ α
0 piqidi/
∫ N
α piqidi, leading to a rise in average utility per variety
of ∫ N
α
u′ (qi)
[∫ α
0
piqidi/α
∫ N
α
piqidi
]
qidi = δ
∫ α
0
piqidi/α.
Letting α approach zero gives us an expression for how 1− ε measures the net welfare gain of
purchasing additional variety: a welfare gain of u(qi) at a welfare cost of δ piqi by proportion-
ally consuming less of other varieties. As pi = u′(qi)/δ , 1− ε(qi) = (u(qi)−u′(qi)qi)/u(qi)
9Additional assumptions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium are in a separate
note available online. Utility functions not satisfying inada conditions are permissible but may require parametric
restrictions to ensure existence.
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denotes the welfare contribution of variety relative to quantity. With these demand-side elastic-
ities in hand, we turn to firms’ production and entry decisions.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of firms which may enter the market for differentiated goods, by paying
a sunk entry cost of fe > 0. The mass of entering firms is denoted by Me. Firms are monop-
olistically competitive and each firm produces a single unique variety. A firm faces an inverse
demand of p(qi) = u′(qi)/δ for variety i. It acts as a monopolist of its unique variety but takes
aggregate demand conditions δ as given. Upon entry, each firm receives a unit cost c≥ 0 drawn
from a distribution G with continuously differentiable pdf g. Each variety can therefore be
indexed by the unit cost c of its producer.
After entry, should a firm produce, it incurs a fixed cost of production f > 0. Profit max-
imization implies firms produce if they can earn non-negative profits net of the fixed costs of
production. A firm with cost draw c chooses its quantity q(c) to maxq(c)[p(q(c))− c]q(c)L
and q(c) > 0 if pi(c) = maxq(c)[p(q(c))− c]q(c)L− f > 0. To ensure the firm’s quantity FOC
is optimal, we assume marginal revenue is strictly decreasing in quantity and the elasticity of
marginal utility µ(q) = |qu′′(q)/u′(q)| is less than one. A firm chooses its quantity to equate
marginal revenue and marginal cost (p+ q · u′′(q)/δ = c), and concavity of the firm problem
ensures low cost firms supply higher quantities and charge lower prices.
The markup charged by a firm with cost draw c is (p(c)− c)/p(c)=−q(c)u′′(q(c))/u′(q(c)).
This shows that the elasticity of marginal utility µ(q) summarizes the markup:
µ(q(c)) = |q(c)u′′(q(c))/u′(q(c))|= (p(c)− c)/p(c).
When µ ′(q)> 0, low cost firms supply higher quantities at higher markups.
2.3 Market Equilibrium
Profits fall with unit cost c, and the cutoff cost level of firms that are indifferent between produc-
ing and exiting from the market is denoted by cd . The cutoff cost cd is fixed by the zero profit
condition, pi(cd) = 0. Firms with cost draws higher than the cutoff level earn negative profits
and do not produce. The mass of producing firms in equilibrium is therefore M = MeG(cd).
In summary, each firm faces a two stage problem: in the second stage it maximizes profits
given a known cost draw, and in the first stage it decides whether to enter given the expected
profits in the second stage. To study the Chamberlinian tradeoff between quantity and variety,
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we maintain the standard free entry condition imposed in monopolistic competition models.
Specifically, ex ante average profit net of sunk entry costs must be zero,
∫ cd
0 pi(c)dG = fe. This
free entry condition along with the consumer’s budget constraint ensures that the resources used
by firms equal the total resources in the economy, L = Me
[∫ cd
0 (cq(c)L+ f )dG+ fe
]
.
2.4 Social Optimum
To assess the efficiency of resource allocation in the market equilibrium, we now describe the
policymaker’s optimal allocation. A policymaker maximizes individual welfare U as given in
Equation (1) by choosing the mass of entrants, quantities and types of firms that produce.10 The
policymaker can choose any allocation of resources that does not exceed the total resources in
the economy. However, she faces the same entry process as for the market: a sunk entry cost
fe must be paid to get a unit cost draw from G(c). Fixed costs of production imply that the
policymaker chooses zero quantities for varieties above a cost threshold. Therefore, all optimal
allocation decisions can be summarized by quantity q(c), potential variety Me and a productivity
cutoff cd . The policymaker chooses q(c), cd and Me to
max Me
∫ cd
0
u(q(c))dG where L≥Me
{∫ cd
0
[cq(c)L+ f ]dG+ fe
}
.
Our approach for arriving at the optimal allocation is to think of optimal quantities qopt(c)
as being determined implicitly by cd and Me so that per capita welfare can be written as
U = Me
∫ cd
0
u(qopt(c))dG. (2)
Optimal quantities ensure marginal utility equals the social marginal cost of a variety, u′(qopt(c))=
λc where λ is the resource multiplier for fixed cd and Me. This is equivalent to the observa-
tion that efficiency requires the Marginal Rate of Substitution to equal the Marginal Rate of
Transformation across varieties, along with an optimal resource multiplier that embodies the
endpoint conditions cd and Me which depend in turn on the cost distribution G. After solving
for each qopt conditional on cd and Me, Equation (2) can be maximized in cd and Me. Of course,
substantial work is involved in showing sufficiency, but we relegate this to the Appendix. The
next two Sections compare the market and optimal allocations in this framework.
10Free entry implies zero expected profits, so the focus is on consumer welfare.
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3 Market Efficiency
Having described an economy consisting of heterogeneous, imperfectly competitive firms, we
now examine welfare and efficiency from integration with world markets. The existence of
gains from international trade is one of the “most fundamental results” in economics (Costinot
and Rodriguez-Clare (2013)). Increases in market size encourage competition, so we might
expect that integration would reduce market power and improve welfare. However, in a second-
best world, there is no guarantee that expanding the economy’s opportunities, through trade
or anything else, necessarily leads to a gain (see Helpman and Krugman (1985), pp. 179).
Building on this insight, we examine efficiency in large markets to understand the potential of
market expansion in eliminating distortions. We show large integrated markets can eliminate
distortions, while preserving firm heterogeneity.
3.1 Integration, Market Size and Efficiency
We begin with the equivalence between market expansion and trade. Proposition 1 shows an
economy can increase its market size by opening to trade with foreign markets. The market
equilibrium between freely trading countries of sizes L1, ...,Ln is identical to the market equi-
librium of a single autarkic country of size L = L1 + ...+Ln, echoing Krugman (1979). This
result is summarized as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Free trade between countries of sizes L1, ...,Ln has the same market outcome as
a unified market of size L = L1+ ...+Ln.
Proof. Consider a home country of size L opening to trade with a foreign country of size L∗.
Suppose the consumer’s budget multipliers are equal in each country so δ = δ ∗ and that the
terms of trade are unity. We will show that the implied allocation can be supported by a set of
prices and therefore constitutes a market equilibrium. The implied quantity allocation, produc-
tivity level and per capita entry are the same across home and foreign consumers, so opening to
trade is equivalent to an increase in market size from L to L+L∗.
Let e denote the home terms of trade, so
e≡M∗e
∫ c∗d
0
p∗xq
∗
xLdG/Me
∫ cd
0
pxqxL∗dG
and by assumption e = e∗ = 1. Then the MR = MC condition implies a home firm chooses
p(c)[1− µ(q(c))] = c in the home market and e · px(c)[1− µ(qx(c))] = c in the foreign mar-
ket. A foreign firm chooses e∗ · p∗(c)[1− µ(q∗(c))] = c in the foreign market and p∗x(c)[1−
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µ(q∗x(c))] = c in the home market. When δ = δ ∗ and e= e∗ = 1, quantity allocations and prices
are identical, i.e. q(c) = q∗x(c) = q∗(c) = qx(c) and p(c) = p∗x(c) = p∗(c) = px(c).
This implies cost cutoffs are also the same across countries. The cost cutoff condition
for home firms is pi + epix = (p(cd)− cd)q(cd)L+ e(px(cd)− cd)qx(cd)L∗ = f . Substituting
for optimal q∗ and q∗x in the analogous foreign cost cutoff condition implies cd = c∗d . From
the resource constraint, this fixes the relationship between entry across countries as L/Me =∫ cd
0 [cq(c)+ cqx(c)+ f ]dG+ fe = L
∗/M∗e . Thus, δ = δ ∗ and e = e∗ = 1 completely determines
the behavior of firms. What remains is to check that δ = δ ∗ and e = e∗ = 1 is consistent with
the consumer’s problem and the balance of trade at these prices and quantities consistent with
firm behavior.
For the consumer’s problem, we require at home that 1 = Me
∫ cd
0 pqdG+M
∗
e
∫ c∗d
0 p
∗
xq
∗
xdG,
which from L/Me = L∗/M∗e is equivalent to
L/Me = L
∫ cd
0
pqdG+L∗
∫ c∗d
0
p∗xq
∗
xdG = L
∫ cd
0
pqdG+L/Me−L
∫ cd
0
pxqxdG.
Therefore to show the consumer’s problem is consistent, it is sufficient to show expenditure on
home goods is equal to expenditure on exported goods (
∫ cd
0 pqdG=
∫ cd
0 pxqxdG), which indeed
holds by the above equalities of prices and quantities. To show the balance of trade is consistent,
we use the consumer budget constraint which gives
e = M∗e
∫ c∗d
0
p∗xq
∗
xLdG/Me
∫ cd
0
pxqxL∗dG = M∗e L/MeL
∗ = 1.
Similarly, the implied foreign terms of trade is e∗ = 1. Thus δ = δ ∗ and e = e∗ = 1 generate an
allocation consistent with monopolistic competition and price system consistent with consumer
maximization and free trade.
Proposition 1 implies that market distortions persist in integrated markets as they are equiv-
alent to larger domestic markets and resource allocation in an integrated market is suboptimal,
except under CES demand (see Dhingra and Morrow (2012)). When markups vary, marginal
revenues do not correspond to marginal utilities so market allocations are not aligned with effi-
cient allocations. This is particularly important when considering trade as a policy option, as it
implies that opening to trade may take the economy further from the social optimum. For ex-
ample, market expansion from trade may induce exit of low productivity firms from the market
when it is optimal to keep more low productivity firms with the purpose of preserving variety.
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3.2 Efficiency in Large Markets
We examine when integrating with large global markets enables a small economy to overcome
its market distortions. From a theoretical perspective, we term a large market the limit of the
economy as the mass of workers L approaches infinity, and in practice we might expect that
sufficiently large markets approximate this limiting case.11
Large markets enable us to understand whether competition can eliminate distortions. For
instance, when firms are symmetric, large markets eliminate distortions as per capita fixed costs
fall to zero. This is because free entry leads to average cost pricing (p = c+ f/qL), so the per
capita fixed costs summarize market power. As market size grows arbitrarily large and per
capita fixed costs fall to zero, markups disappear leading to perfect competition and efficient
allocations in large markets.
Building on this reasoning, we develop the large market concept in two directions to under-
stand the sources of inefficiency. First, we tie the conditions for efficiency to demand primitives,
taking into account endogeneity of allocations. In the homogenous firm example above, this
amounts to determining how f/qL changes with market size under different model primitives.
Second, we examine whether productivity differences are compatible with large markets. When
firms are heterogeneous, simply knowing per capita fixed costs does not explain the distribution
of productivity, prices and quantity. At least three salient outcomes can occur. One outcome
is that competitive pressures might weed out all firms but the most productive. This occurs for
instance when marginal revenue is bounded, as when u is quadratic or CARA (e.g. Behrens and
Murata 2012). It may also happen that access to large markets allows even the least productive
firms to amortize fixed costs and produce. To retain the fundamental properties of monopolistic
competition under productivity differences, we chart out a third possibility between these two
extremes: some, but not all, firms produce. To do so, we maintain the previous regularity con-
ditions for a market equilibrium. In order to aid the analysis, we make three assumptions on
demand at small quantities. The first assumption enables a clear distinction between the three
salient outcomes in large markets.
Assumption (Interior Markups). The inverse demand elasticity and elasticity of utility are
bounded away from 0 and 1 for small quantities. Formally, lim
q→0
µ(q) and lim
q→0
ε(q) ∈ (0,1).
The assumption of interior markups guarantees that as the quantity sold from a firm to a
consumer becomes small (as happens for all positive unit cost firms), markups remain positive
(µ > 0) and prices remain bounded (µ < 1). It also guarantees that the added utility provided
per labor unit at the optimum converges to a non-zero constant (e.g., Solow 1998, Kuhn and
11How large markets need to be to justify this approximation is an open quantitative question.
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Vives 1999). An example of a class of utility functions satisfying interior markups is the expo-
power utility where u(q) = [1− exp(−αq1−ρ)]/α for ρ ∈ (0,1). It nests CES preferences for
α = 0.
When markups are interior, there is a sharp taxonomy of what may happen to the distribu-
tion of costs, prices and total quantities (Lq(c)), as shown in Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
In words, Proposition 3 shows that when markups are interior and the cost cutoff converges,
one of three things must happen. 1) Only the lowest cost firms remain and prices go to zero
(akin to perfect competition), while the lowest cost firms produce infinite total quantities. 2)
Post-entry, all firms produce independent of cost while prices become unbounded and the to-
tal quantities produced become negligible, akin to a “rentier” case where firms produce little
after fixed costs are incurred. 3) The cost cutoff converges to a positive finite level, and a
non-degenerate distribution of prices and total quantities persists. Although each of these pos-
sibilities might be of interest, we focus on the case when the limiting cost draw distribution
exhibits heterogeneity ( lim
L→∞
cmktd > 0) but fixed costs still play a role in determining which firms
produce ( lim
L→∞
cmktd < ∞). We therefore make the following assumption, which by Proposition 3
will guarantee non-degenerate prices and total quantities:
Assumption (Interior Convergence). In the large economy, the market and optimal allocations
have a non-degenerate cost distribution in which some but not all entrants produce.
Under interior markups and convergence, the economy converges to a monopolistically
competitive limit distinct from the extremes of a perfectly competitive limit or a rentier limit.
As the economy grows, each worker consumes a negligible quantity of each variety. At these
low levels of quantity, the inverse demand elasticity does not vanish and firms can still extract a
positive markup µ . This is in sharp contrast to a competitive limit, in which firms are left with
no market power and µ drops to zero. Similarly, the social markup (1−ε) does not drop to zero
in the monopolistically competitive limit, so each variety contributes at a positive rate to utility
even at low levels of quantity. The monopolistically competitive limit is therefore consistent
with positive markups which become more uniform with increased market size.
In fact, this monopolistically competitive limit has a sharper characterization very close to
the conditions which characterize a finite size market under CES demand (including efficiency).
We therefore refer to it as a “CES limit” and introduce one last regularity condition to obtain
this result.
Assumption (Market Identification). Quantity ratios distinguish price ratios for small q:
If κ 6= κ˜ then lim
q−→0
p(κq)/p(q) 6= lim
q−→0
p(κ˜q)/p(q).
12
Market identification guarantees production levels across firms can be distinguished if the
firms charge distinct prices as quantities sold become negligible. Combining these three as-
sumptions of interior markups, convergence and identification ensures the large economy goes
to the CES limit, summarized as Proposition 2. The intuition for the role of these assump-
tions follows. As market size grows large, q −→ 0 so under Interior Markups, (p− c)/p =
µ (q)−→ µ (0) and, finite but non-zero markups can persist in the large economy. Since profits
are µ (q)/(1−µ (q)) ·Lcq, whether a particular firm survives in the large economy depends on
how variable costs Lcq evolve with market size. Clearly, if variable costs diverge to zero for a
firm with cost c, that firm must eventually exit, while if variable costs diverge to infinity, the
firm must eventually enter. To arrive at the CES limit, necessarily variable costs must converge
to a positive level, which requires convergence of the total quantity sold, Lq. However, since
firms are embedded in a heterogeneous environment where aggregate conditions impact firm
behavior, the pointwise convergence of markups {µ (q(c))} is not sufficient to guarantee that
total quantities {Lq(c)} are well behaved in aggregate. What is sufficient is that prices {p(c)}
can distinguish firms as market size grows large, thus the Market Identification condition.12
Proposition 2. Under the above assumptions, as market size approaches infinity, outcomes
approach the CES limit. This limit has the following characteristics:
1. Prices, markups and expected profits converge to positive constants.
2. Per capita quantities q(c) go to zero, while aggregate quantities Lq(c) converge.
3. Relative quantities Lq(c)/Lq(cd) converge to (c/cd)−1/α with α = limq−→0 µ(q).
4. The entrant per worker ratio Me/L converges.
5. The market and socially optimal allocations coincide.
Proposition 2 shows that integration with large markets can push economies based on vari-
able elasticity demand to the CES limit. In this limit, the inverse demand elasticity and the
elasticity of utility become constant, ensuring the market outcome is socially optimal. Firms
charge constant markups which exactly cross-subsidize entry of low productivity firms to pre-
serve variety. This wipes out the distortions of imperfect competition as the economy becomes
large. While dealing with the assumptions of the market equilibrium is somewhat delicate (see
Appendix), we can explain Proposition 2 intuitively in terms of our previous result that CES
preferences induce efficiency. In large markets, the quantity q(c) sold to any individual con-
sumer goes to zero, so markups µ(q(c)) converge to the same constant independent of c.13
12From a technical standpoint, this guarantees entry is well behaved, avoiding pathological sequences of poten-
tial equilibria as market size grows large.
13The rate at which markups converge depends on c and is in any case endogenous (see Appendix).
13
This convergence to constant markups aligns perfectly with those generated by CES prefer-
ences with an exponent equal to 1− limq−→0 µ(q). Thus, large markets reduce distortions until
market allocations are perfectly aligned with socially optimal objectives.
The CES limit is optimal despite the presence of imperfect competition in the limit, but it
is an open empirical question whether markets are sufficiently large for this to be a reasonable
approximation to use in lieu of richer variable elasticity demand. When integrated markets are
small, variable markups are crucial in understanding distortions and additional gains can be
reaped by using domestic policy in conjunction with trade policy.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines the efficiency of market allocations when firms vary in productivity and
markups. Considering the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz framework, the efficiency of CES demand is
valid even with productivity differences across firms. This is because market outcomes maxi-
mize revenue, and under CES demand, private and social incentives are perfectly aligned.
When firms differ in market power, the market outcomes of quantity, variety and produc-
tivity are not socially optimal due to imperfect competition among firms. We examine whether
international integration can be a policy tool to mitigate these distortions through increased
competition. Market expansion does not guarantee welfare gains under imperfect competition.
But we find that integrating with large markets holds out the possibility of approaching the CES
limit, which induces constant markups and therefore an efficient outcome.
Even though integration can cause market and social objectives to perfectly align, “How
Large is Large?” is an open question. Further work quantifying these relationships could ex-
plain the scope for integration as a tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive
markets.
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A Appendix: The Impact of Large Markets
To arrive at the large market result, we first state Lemmas characterizing convergence in the
large market and then show market allocations coincide with optimal allocations. Detailed
proofs of the Lemmas are in the Online Appendix.
Lemma 1. As market size becomes large:
1. Market revenue per capita is increasing in market size and goes to infinity.
2. At the optimum, utility per capita is increasing in market size and goes to infinity.
3. Market entry goes to infinity.
Proof. From Dhingra and Morrow (2012), the market allocation solves
max
Me,cd ,q(c)
LMe
∫ cd
0
u′ (q(c))q(c)dG subject to L≥Me
(∫ cd
0
Lcq(c)+ f dG+Fe
)
.
Let R(L)≡Me
∫ cd
0 u
′ (q(c))q(c)dG be the revenue per capita under the market allocation. Fix L
and let {q(c),cd,Me} denote the market allocation with L resources. Consider an increased re-
source level L˜ > L with allocation
{
q˜(c), c˜d,M˜e
}≡ {(L/L˜) ·q(c),cd,(L˜/L) ·Me} which direct
inspection shows is feasible. This allocation generates revenue per capita of
M˜e
∫ c˜d
0
u′ (q˜(c))q(c)dG = Me
∫ cd
0
u′
((
L/L˜
) ·q(c))q(c)dG≤ R(L˜) .
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Since u is concave, it follows that R
(
L˜
)
> R(L). Since q˜(c) =
(
L/L˜
) ·q(c)−→ 0 for all c > 0
and limq−→0 u′ (q) = ∞, revenue per capita goes to infinity as L˜ −→ ∞. A similar argument
holds for the social optimum.
First note that q(c) is fixed by u′ (q(c)) [1−µ (q(c))] = δc, and δ −→ ∞ and µ (q(c)) is
bounded, it must be that u′ (q(c)) −→ ∞ for c > 0. This requires q(c) −→ 0 for c > 0. Since
revenue u′ (q(c))q(c) is equal to ε (q(c))u(q(c)) and ε is bounded, revenue also goes to zero
for each c > 0. Revenue is also decreasing in δ for every c, so we can bound revenue with a
function B(c). In particular, for any fixed market size L˜ and implied allocation
{
q˜(c), c˜d,M˜e
}
,
for L≥ L˜:
u′ (q(c))q(c)1[0,cd ](c)≤ u′ (q˜(c)) q˜(c)1[0,c˜d ](c)+u′ (q˜(c˜d)) q˜(c˜d)1[c˜d ,∞](c)≡ B(c) (3)
where we appeal to the fact that q(c) is decreasing in c for any market size. Since for any L,∫ cd
0 u
′ (q(c))q(c)dG= δ/Me, it is clear that
∫ ∞
0 B(c)dG=
∫ c˜d
0 u
′ (q˜(c)) q˜(c)dG+u′ (q˜(cd)) q˜(cd)<
∞. Since u′ (q(c))q(c) converges pointwise to zero for c > 0, we conclude
lim
L−→∞
∫ cd
0
u′ (q(c))q(c)dG =
∫ cd
0
lim
L−→∞
u′ (q(c))q(c)dG = 0
by dominated convergence. Therefore limL−→∞ δ/Me = 0 which with δ −→∞ shows Me−→∞.
The optimal allocation case is similar.
Lemma 2. For all market sizes and all positive marginal cost (c > 0) firms:
1. Profits (pi(c)) and social profits (ϖ(c)≡ (1− ε(c))/ε(c) · cq(c)L− f ) are bounded.
2. Total quantities (Lq(c)) in the market and optimal allocation are bounded.
Proof. For any costs cL < cH , q(cH) is in the choice set of a firm with costs cL and therefore
pi(cL)≥ (p(cH)− cL)q(cH)L− f = pi(cH)+(cH− cL)q(cH)L. (4)
Furthermore, for every c˜ > 0, we argue pi(c˜) is bounded. For c≡ c˜/2, pi(c˜)≤ pi(c) while pi(c)
is bounded since lim
L→∞
∫ cd
0 pi(c)dG = Fe and limsup
L→∞
pi(c) =∞ would imply limsup
L→∞
∫ cd
0 pi(c)dG =
∞. It follows from Equation (4) that Lq(c) is bounded. Substituting ϖ for pi leads to similar
arguments for the social optimum.
Proposition 3. Assume markups are interior. Then under the market allocation:
1. lim
L→∞
cmktd = ∞ iff limL→∞
p
(
cmktd
)
= ∞ iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
cmktd
)
= 0.
2. lim
L→∞
cmktd = 0 iff limL→∞
p
(
cmktd
)
= 0 iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
cmktd
)
= ∞.
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3. lim
L→∞
cmktd ∈ (0,∞) iff limL→∞p
(
cmktd
) ∈ (0,∞) iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
cmktd
) ∈ (0,∞).
Similarly, under the optimal allocation:
1. lim
L→∞
coptd = ∞ iff limL→∞
u◦q
(
coptd
)
/λq
(
coptd
)
= ∞ iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
coptd
)
= 0.
2. lim
L→∞
coptd = 0 iff limL→∞
u◦q
(
coptd
)
/λq
(
coptd
)
= 0 iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
coptd
)
= ∞.
3. lim
L→∞
coptd ∈ (0,∞) iff limL→∞u◦q
(
coptd
)
/λq
(
coptd
)
∈ (0,∞) iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
coptd
)
∈ (0,∞).
Proof. Note the following zero profit relationships that hold at the cost cutoff ca, suppressing
the market superscripts throughout we have:
u′ (q(cd))/δ − f/ [Lq(cd) ·µ ◦q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd))] = cd, (5)
Lcdq(cd) ·µ ◦q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd)) = f . (6)
First, if lim
L→∞
Lq(cd) = 0, Equation (6) implies cd · µ ◦ q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd)) −→ ∞. Clearly
q(cd) −→ 0 and since lim
q→0
µ (q) ∈ (0,1), µ ◦ q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd)) is bounded, and therefore
cd −→ ∞. Now suppose cd −→ ∞ and since cd ≤ u′ (q(cd))/δ , u′ (q(cd))/δ −→ ∞. Finally, if
u′ (q(cd))/δ −→∞, since δ −→∞, necessarily q(cd)−→ 0 so we find µ ◦q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd))
is bounded. It follows from Equation (6) that Lcdq(cd) is bounded, so from Equation (5),
Lq(cd) ·u′ (q(cd))/δ is bounded so Lq(cd)−→ 0.
If lim
L→∞
Lq(cd) = ∞, q(cd) −→ 0 so from lim
q→0
µ (q) ∈ (0,1), µ ◦ q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd)) is
bounded. Therefore from Equation (6), cd −→ 0. Now assume cd −→ 0 so from (6), Lq(cd) ·
µ ◦ q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd)) −→ ∞ which implies with Equation (5) that u′ (q(cd))/δ −→ 0.
Finally, if u′ (q(cd))/δ −→ 0, (5) shows cd −→ 0.
The second set of equivalences follows from examining the conditions for a firm at the
limiting cost cutoff c∞d ∈ (0,∞). The argument for the optimal allocation is similar.
Lemma 3. Assume interior convergence. Then as market size grows large:
1. In the market, p(c) converges in (0,∞) for c > 0 and Lq(cd) converges in (0,∞).
2. In the optimum, u◦q(c)/λq(c) and Lq(cd) converge in (0,∞) for c > 0.
Proof. Since q(c) −→ 0 for all c > 0, lim
q→0
µ(q) ∈ (0,1) shows lim
L→∞
p(c) aligns with constant
markups and thus converges for all c> 0. In particular, p(cd) converges and L(p(cd)− cd)q(cd)=
f so it follows Lq(cd) converges. Similar arguments hold for the social optimum.
Lemma 4. Assume interior convergence and large market identification. Then for the market
and social optimum, Lq(c) converges for c > 0.
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Proof. Fix any c > 0 and first note that for both the market and social planner, q(c)/q(cd) =
Lq(c)/Lq(cd) and both Lq(c) and Lq(cd) are bounded, so q(c)/q(cd) is bounded.
Now consider the market. q(c)/q(cd)≥ 1 has at least one limit point and if it has two limit
points, say a and b with a< b, there exist subsequences (q(c)/q(cd))an→ a and (q(c)/q(cd))bn→
b. There also exist distinct κ and κ˜ in (a,b) so that eventually
(q(c))an < κq(cd)an < κ˜q(cd)bn < (q(c))bn .
With u′′ < 0 this implies
(
u′(q(c))/u′(q(cd))
)
an
>
(
u′(κq(cd))/u′(q(cd))
)
an
>
(
u′(κ˜q(cd))/u′(q(cd))
)
bn
>
(
u′(q(c))/u′(q(cd))
)
bn
.
By assumption, lim
q→0
u′(κq)/u′(q)> lim
q→0
u′(κ˜q)/u′(q) but since q(c)−→ 0,
lim
n→∞
(
u′ ◦q(c)/u′ ◦q(cd)
)
an
= lim
n→∞([1−µ ◦q(c)]c/ [1−µ ◦q(cd)]cd)an = c/cd
= lim
n→∞
(
u′ ◦q(c)/u′ ◦q(cd)
)
bn
where we have used the fact that lim
q→0
µ (q) ∈ (0,1), however by assumption this contradicts
a < b.
For the social optimum, this argument holds (substituting ε 6= 0 for u′′ < 0) so long as
κ 6= κ˜ implies lim
q→0
(u(κq)/κq)/(u(q)/q) 6= lim
q→0
(u(κ˜q)/κq)/(u(q)/q) . (7)
Since lim
q→0
u′(q) = ∞ and lim
q→0
ε ∈ (0,∞) it follows that lim
q→0
u(q)/q = ∞. By L’Hospital’s rule,
lim
q→0
(u(κq)/κq)/(u(q)/q) = lim
q→0
u′(κq)/u′(q) for all κ so the condition (7) in holds because
κ 6= κ˜ implies lim
q→0
u′(κq)/u′(q) 6= lim
q→0
u′(κ˜q)/u′(q).
Lemma 5. At extreme quantities, social and private markups align as follows:
1. If lim
q→0
1− ε(q)< 1 then lim
q→0
1− ε(q) = lim
q→0
µ(q).
2. If lim
q→∞1− ε(q)< 1 then limq→∞1− ε(q) = limq→∞µ(q).
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Proof. By assumption, lim
q→0
ε(q)> 0. Expanding this limit via L’Hospital’s rule shows
lim
q→0
ε(q) = lim
q→0
q/
(
u(q)/u′(q)
)
= lim
q→0
1/ lim
q→0
(
1−u(q)u′′(q)/(u′(q))2)
= 1/ lim
q→0
(1+µ (q)/ε (q)) = lim
q→0
ε (q)/ lim
q→0
(ε (q)+µ (q))
which gives the first part of the result. Identical steps for q−→ ∞ give the second part.
Lemma 6. Assume interior convergence and large market identification. As market size grows
large:
1. q(c)/q(cd)−→ (c/cd)−1/α with α = lim
q→0
µ (q).
2. The cost cutoffs for the social optimum and market converge to the same value.
3. The entrant per worker ratios Me/L converge to the same value.
Proof. Define ϒ(c/cd) by (the above results show this limit is well defined)
ϒ(c/cd)≡ lim
q→0
u′(ϒ(c/cd)q)/u′(q) = c/cd.
We will show in fact that ϒ(c/cd) = (c/cd)−α . It follows from the definition that ϒ is weakly
decreasing, and the results above show ϒ is one to one, so it is strictly decreasing. Define
fq(z)≡ u′(zq)/u′(q) so lim
q→0
fq(z) = ϒ−1(z) for all ϒ−1(z) ∈ (0,1). Note
f ′q(z) = u
′′(zq)q/u′(q) =−µ(zq) ·u′(zq)/zu′(q)
so since lim
q→0
µ(zq) = µ∞ ∈ (0,1) and lim
q→0
u′(zq)/zu′(q) = ϒ−1(z)/z, we know that lim
q→0
f ′q(z) =
−µ∞ϒ−1(z)/z. On any strictly positive closed interval I, µ and u′(zq)/zu′(q) are monotone in z
so f ′q(z) converges uniformly on I as q−→ 0. Rudin (1964) (Thm 7.17) shows
lim
q−→0
f ′q(z) = d limq−→0
f q(z)/dz =−µ∞ϒ−1(z)/z = dϒ−1(z)/dz. (8)
We conclude that ϒ−1(z) is differentiable and thus continuous. Given the form deduced in
(8), ϒ−1(z) is continuously differentiable. Since dϒ−1(z)/dz = 1/ϒ′ ◦ϒ−1(z), composing both
sides with ϒ(z) and using (8) we have ϒ′(z) = −ϒ(z)/µ∞z. Therefore ϒ is CES, in particular
ϒ(z) = z−1/µ∞ .
Finally, let copt∞ and cmkt∞ be the limiting cost cutoffs as L−→∞ for at the social optimum and
market, respectively. Letting qopt(c), qmkt(c) denote the socially optimal and market quantities,
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we know from above that for all c > 0:
qopt (c)/qopt
(
coptd
)
−→ (copt∞ /c)1/α , qmkt (c)/qmkt(cmktd )−→ (cmkt∞ /c)1/α . (9)
Now consider the conditions involving fe,
∫ cmktd
0 pi(c)dG = fe =
∫ coptd
0 ϖ(c)dG. Expanding,
L
∫ cmktd
0
µ ◦qmkt(c)
1−µ ◦qmkt(c)cq
mkt(c)dG− f G(cmktd ) = L
∫ coptd
0
1− ε ◦qopt(c)
ε ◦qopt(c) cq
opt(c)dG− f G(coptd ).
It necessarily follows that
lim
L−→∞
L
∫ cmktd
0
µ ◦qmkt(c)/
(
1−µ ◦qmkt(c)
)
· cqmkt(c)dG− f G(cmktd ) =
lim
L−→∞
L
∫ coptd
0
(
1− ε ◦qopt(c))/ε ◦qopt(c) · cqopt(c)dG− f G(coptd ). (10)
Using Equation (9), we see that Lqopt(c) and Lqmkt(c) converge uniformly on any strictly posi-
tive closed interval. Combined with the fact that lim
q→0
µ(q) = lim
q→0
1−ε(q), we see from Equation
(10) the limits of the µ/(1−µ) and (1− ε)/ε terms are equal and factor out of Equation (10),
leaving
lim
L−→∞
Lcmkt∞ q
mkt(cmkt∞ )
∫ cmktd
0
(c/cmkt∞ )(c/c
mkt
d )
−1/αdG− f G(cmktd ) =
lim
L−→∞
Lcopt∞ q
opt(copt∞ )
∫ coptd
0
(c/copt∞ )(c/c
opt
d )
−1/αdG− f G(coptd ).
Noting f (1−µ∞)/µ∞ = Lcmkt∞ qmkt(cmkt∞ ) = Lcopt∞ qopt(copt∞ ), we therefore have
lim
L−→∞
∫ cmktd
0
(c/cmkt∞ )
1−1/α(cmkt∞ /c
mkt
d )
−1/αdG−G(cmktd ) =
lim
L−→∞
∫ coptd
0
(c/copt∞ )
1−1/α(copt∞ /c
opt
d )
−1/αdG−G(coptd )
so that finally evaluating the limits, we have
∫ cmkt∞
0
[
(c/cmkt∞ )
1−1/α −1
]
dG =
∫ copt∞
0
[
(c/copt∞ )
1−1/α −1
]
dG. (11)
Letting h(w) ≡ ∫ w0 [(c/w)1−1/α −1]dG, we see that h′(w) = ∫ w0 (1/α−1)c1−1/αw1/α−2dG
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and since α = µ∞ ∈ (0,1), h′ > 0. Since h is strictly increasing, there is a unique copt∞ , namely
copt∞ = cmkt∞ such that Equation (11) holds. Checking the conditions for L/Me show they coincide
between the market and social optimum as well.
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